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I. INTRODUCTION 
When thinking about celebrated free speech cases since 1950, a dozen 
or so U.S. Supreme Court rulings involving the First Amendment1 probably 
come readily to mind. They likely include, chronologically, free speech 
victories such as New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,2 Tinker v. Des Moines 
Independent Community School District,3 Brandenburg v. Ohio,4 Cohen v. 
California,5 New York Times Co. v. United States,6 Miami Herald 
                                                                                                                 
 1. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that 
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .” U.S. 
CONST. amend. I. The Free Speech and Free Press Clauses were incorporated nearly ninety 
years ago through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause as fundamental liberties to 
apply to state and local government entities and officials. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 
652, 666 (1925). 
 2. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In Sullivan, a defamation case in 
which Alabama applied a strict liability fault standard, the Court held that: 
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a 
public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to 
his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with “actual 
malice”—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of 
whether it was false or not.  
Id. at 279–80. See also Akhil Reed Amar, The Second Amendment: A Case Study in 
Constitutional Interpretation, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 889, 906 (2001) (calling Sullivan 
“perhaps the most important First Amendment case of the modern era”); David Fontana, 
Refined Comparativism in Constitutional Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 539, 601 n.332 (2001) 
(calling Sullivan “[t]he most important First Amendment case of recent times . . . .”). 
 3. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). In Tinker, the 
Court extended First Amendment speech protection to minors in public school settings, 
reasoning that: 
State-operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism. School officials 
do not possess absolute authority over their students. Students in school as well 
as out of school are “persons” under our Constitution. They are possessed of 
fundamental rights which the State must respect, just as they themselves must 
respect their obligations to the State. 
Id. at 511. 
 4. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). In Brandenburg, the Court held that: 
The constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a 
State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation 
except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent 
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.   
Id. at 447. See also John Charles Kunich, Natural Born Copycat Killers and the Law of 
Shock Torts, 78 WASH. U. L. Q. 1157, 1221 (2000) (considering Brandenburg among the 
“key First Amendment cases dealing with various forms of criminal syndicalism statutes . . . 
.”). 
 5. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). In Cohen, the Supreme Court protected 
the speech rights of a man who wore a jacket emblazoned with the words “Fuck the Draft” 
in the corridors of a Los Angeles-area courthouse during the Vietnam War era. Id. at 26 
(concluding that “the State may not, consistently with the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments, make the simple public display here involved of this single four-letter 
expletive a criminal offense.”). 
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Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,7 Hustler Magazine v. Falwell,8 Texas v. 
Johnson,9 Florida Star v. B.J.F.,10 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections 
Commission,11 Reno v. ACLU,12 and Snyder v. Phelps.13 Besides Snyder, 
                                                                                                                 
 6. N. Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). In New York Times Co., the 
Supreme Court held, in a per curiam opinion, that the government could not properly 
restrain the publication by the New York Times and the Washington Post of excerpts taken 
from a stolen, classified government study entitled “History of U.S. Decision-Making 
Process on Viet Nam Policy.” Id. at 714. See also James L. Oakes, The Doctrine of Prior 
Restraint Since the Pentagon Papers, 15 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 497, 505 (1982) (observing 
that New York Times Co. v. United States “remains the key first amendment case of the 
decade.”). 
 7. Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). In Tornillo, the 
Supreme Court struck down a Florida statute granting a political candidate a right to equal 
space to reply to criticism and attacks on his record by a newspaper, reasoning that: 
The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to 
limitations on the size and content of the paper, and treatment of public issues 
and public officials—whether fair or unfair—constitute the exercise of 
editorial control and judgment. It has yet to be demonstrated how 
governmental regulation of this crucial process can be exercised consistent 
with First Amendment guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to this 
time. 
Id. at 258. 
 8. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). In Falwell, the Court, in 
examining the scope of First Amendment protection for the publisher of an ad parody 
suggesting that a well-known reverend experienced his first sexual encounter in a fly-
infested, goat-eradicated outhouse with his mother and that he preached while intoxicated, 
held that: 
[P]ublic figures and public officials may not recover for the tort of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress by reason of publications such as the one here 
at issue without showing in addition that the publication contains a false 
statement of fact which was made with “actual malice,” i.e., with knowledge 
that the statement was false or with reckless disregard as to whether or not it 
was true.  
Id. at 56. 
 9. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). In Johnson, the Court protected the right of 
a person to burn the American flag as a form of symbolic protest near a political convention, 
observing that “[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that 
the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the 
idea itself offensive or disagreeable.” Id. at 414. 
 10. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989). In Florida Star, which centered on the 
publication of the name of an alleged sexual assault victim, the Court held “that where a 
newspaper publishes truthful information which it has lawfully obtained, punishment may 
lawfully be imposed, if at all, only when narrowly tailored to a state interest of the highest 
order . . . .” Id. at 541. See also Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying 
Privacy Protections Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 1021–22 (2003) (calling Florida 
Star “perhaps the most important First Amendment case involving disclosure protections 
. . . .”). 
 11. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995). In McIntyre, the Court 
declared unconstitutional an Ohio statute that prohibited the distribution of anonymous 
campaign literature, reasoning that “[u]nder our Constitution, anonymous pamphleteering is 
not a pernicious, fraudulent practice, but an honorable tradition of advocacy and of dissent.  
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other relatively recent cases like Bartnicki v. Vopper14 and Brown v. 
Entertainment Merchants Association15 might also come to First 
Amendment scholars’ minds.   
This Article contends, however, that one of the most important free 
speech cases since 1950—an especially vital case today when considered 
within the context of the ongoing culture wars in which shielding minors 
from supposedly harmful content is an often-used government rationale, or 
perhaps excuse, for censorship—is the much less celebrated 1957 high 
court decision in Butler v. Michigan.16 One current constitutional law 
casebook devotes a meager three sentences—in a “note” section, no less—
                                                                                                                 
Anonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the majority.” Id. at 357. See also David L. 
Hudson, Jr., Stevens’ Top 10 in First Amendment Jurisprudence, FIRST AMENDMENT 
CENTER (Apr. 14, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/stevens-top-10-
in-first-amendment-jurisprudence (listing McIntyre as one of the top ten First Amendment 
opinions written by former Justice John Paul Stevens). 
 12. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). In Reno, the Court struck down a portion of 
the Communications Decency Act and reasoned, in the process, that when it comes to 
speech conveyed on the Internet, there was “no basis for qualifying the level of First 
Amendment scrutiny that should be applied . . . .” Id. at 870. See also Mark S. Kende, Lost 
in Cyberspace: The Judiciary’s Distracted Application of Free Speech and Personal 
Jurisdiction Doctrines to the Internet, 77 OR. L. REV. 1125, 1154 (1998) (“Some 
commentators have called the Supreme Court’s first cyberspace decision in Reno the most 
important free speech case of the last twenty years.”). 
 13. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). In Snyder, the Court protected the First 
Amendment speech rights of members of the Westboro Baptist Church to protest, with 
offensive signs, near a funeral held for a U.S. soldier killed in Iraq, observing that the 
“Westboro picketers displayed their signs for about 30 minutes before the funeral began and 
sang hymns and recited Bible verses. None of the picketers entered church property or went 
to the cemetery. They did not yell or use profanity, and there was no violence associated 
with the picketing.” Id. at 1213. 
 14. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001). In Bartnicki, the Court held that the First 
Amendment protected the disclosure by a radio talk show host of the contents of an illegally 
recorded cell phone conversation about a topic of public concern, reasoning that “privacy 
concerns give way when balanced against the interest in publishing matters of public 
importance.” Id. at 534. 
 15. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). In Brown, the Court 
declared unconstitutional a California statute restricting minors’ access to video games 
depicting violent content, reasoning that: 
[T]he legislation is seriously underinclusive, not only because it excludes 
portrayals other than video games, but also because it permits a parental or 
avuncular veto. And as a means of assisting concerned parents it is seriously 
overinclusive because it abridges the First Amendment rights of young people 
whose parents (and aunts and uncles) think violent video games are a harmless 
pastime. And the overbreadth in achieving one goal is not cured by the 
underbreadth in achieving the other. Legislation such as this, which is neither 
fish nor fowl, cannot survive strict scrutiny. 
Id. at 2742. 
 16. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957). 
Number 2] FREE SPEECH VICTORY 251 
to Butler,17 while another casebook fails to mention it at all.18 The Butler 
opinion spans a mere five pages in the United States Reports and consists 
of fewer than ten total paragraphs.19 It illustrates, however, that brevity, 
concision, and unanimity are powerful characteristics when a Supreme 
Court opinion identifies—employing a memorable phrase in the process—a 
clear-cut, timeless legal principle upon which future courts and jurists can 
build and premise their own decisions. 
Part II of this Article provides an overview of Butler, including 
background on the key protagonists in the controversy.20 Part III then 
illustrates how the central holding of Butler has been employed numerous 
times over the past fifty years across multiple media platforms, including 
the Internet, and in a wide range of factual scenarios.21 Next, Part IV 
argues that Butler will remain important in the near future, and identifies 
the reasons why Butler has proved so powerful despite not typically falling 
within the pantheon of celebrated First Amendment victories.22 
II. THE STORY BEHIND BUTLER AND THE PRINCIPLE TO WHICH 
IT GAVE RISE: BURNING DOWN THE FIRST AMENDMENT HOUSE 
TO ROAST THE OFFENDING PIG 
“The incidence of this enactment is to reduce the adult population of 
Michigan to reading only what is fit for children.”23 
This critical observation in Butler gave rise to a pivotal principle in 
First Amendment jurisprudence—that the government cannot, in the name 
of shielding minors from supposedly objectionable content, implement a 
blanket ban on that content and thereby reduce the scope of speech 
available to consenting adults. The effect of such measures, as Justice Felix 
Frankfurter colorfully wrote, is “to burn the house to roast the pig.”24 In 
short, Butler is a crucial victory for the First Amendment rights of adults to 
                                                                                                                 
 17. GEOFFREY STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1179 n.3 (6th ed. 2009). 
 18. NORMAN REDLICH ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (4th ed. 2002). Butler is not listed 
in the table of cases in this book. Id. at TC-1–TC-19. 
 19. The decision spans from page 380 through page 384 in the bound version of the 
United States Reports, which “contain the final, official opinions of the Supreme Court of 
the United States.” BOUND VOLUMES, U.S. SUPREME COURT, 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/boundvolumes.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 2012). 
 20. See infra notes 23–87 and accompanying text. 
 21. See infra notes 88–167 and accompanying text. 
 22. See infra notes 168–98 and accompanying text. 
 23. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957). 
 24. Id.  
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receive controversial speech.25 It also marks a key defeat for the long-
standing notion of censoring speech in the name of protecting children.26 
How did the Court reach this result in Butler? It all began with a 1952 
novel by John Howard Griffin called The Devil Rides Outside27—a title 
that, ironically, is never mentioned in the Supreme Court’s ruling in Butler. 
The New York Times described the book as “a frankly autobiographical 
account of [Griffin’s] spiritual experiences living in French monasteries 
while he pursued his musical studies.”28 While The Devil Rides Outside 
ultimately spawned a Supreme Court decision, it was Griffin’s later book, 
Black Like Me, based upon Griffin’s travels through the South for six 
weeks after he died his skin black,29 for which he is perhaps more 
famous.30 Black Like Me, as the Washington Post observed, “opened a 
window to the wider public on the Southern system of racial interaction 
and changed Griffin’s life forever.”31   
While Black Like Me might have opened a window to the public on 
white Southern bigotry, The Devil Rides Outside opened a window on 
Northern censorship. The Devil Rides Outside was a best-selling novel,32 
despite a New York Times review that described it as plagued by “a series 
of heavy faults” and that “[p]assage after passage is overlong: the prose is 
overblown and trails endlessly, like a thin mist on a Scottish moor.”33 
                                                                                                                 
 25. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (“The right of freedom of 
speech and press includes not only the right to utter or to print, but the right to distribute, the 
right to receive, the right to read . . . .”) (emphasis added); see also Martin v. City of 
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) (observing that the First Amendment freedom of speech 
“necessarily protects the right to receive it.”). 
 26. Cf. Alan E. Garfield, Protecting Children From Speech, 57 FLA. L. REV. 565, 566, 
568 (2005) (“The notion that children need to be sheltered from inappropriate speech long 
predates Janet Jackson’s ‘wardrobe malfunction’ or Bono’s expletive-enhanced acceptance 
of a Golden Globe” and asserting that “desire to protect children, though well-intentioned, 
has always been on a collision course with freedom of speech. The collision between these 
two values has occurred gradually.”).  
 27. See Jerome Weeks, Black Like Me, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Sept. 8, 1997, at 1C 
(providing background on John Howard Griffin) (“An acclaimed debut, The Devil Rides 
Outside was banned in Detroit by a Catholic decency group. In 1957, the U.S. Supreme 
Court struck down the Michigan ban.”). 
 28. Joan Cook, John H. Griffin Dead; White Novelist Wrote Book ‘Black Like Me’, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1980, at D21.  
 29. See Georgina Kleege, The Strange Life and Times of John Howard Griffin, 26 
RARITAN 96, 96 (2007) (describing Black Like Me as “Griffin’s account of the six weeks he 
spent disguised as an African American traveling through the Deep South . . . .”). 
 30. See Fritz Lanham, Publisher Reissues ‘Black Like Me,’ HOUS. CHRON., May 23, 
2004, www.chron.com/life/article/Publisher-reissues-Black-Like-Me-1573282.php. 
 31. Karen De Witt, Black Like Me, 20 Years Later, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 1977, at Style 
F1. 
 32. Author Suddenly Regains Sight, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1957, at 25. 
 33. Thomas Sugrue, Everyman’s Triumph, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1952, at BR5. 
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Censors “objected to Griffin’s lengthy descriptions of sexual activity,”34 
including one passage in which the book’s narrator describes “a vision of 
strong legs, deep navels, bursting milk-white breasts—insatiable, grasping, 
choking triangles of pubic greyness before my eyes.”35  
One of those best-selling copies of The Devil Rides Outside, as it 
turns out, was purchased by a Detroit police inspector from a book dealer 
named Alfred E. Butler, who was fined one hundred dollars for the illegal 
transaction.36 Alfred Butler, in fact, was no ordinary bookseller; he was the 
Detroit district sales manager for Pocket Books.37 Pocket Books was 
America’s first paperback publisher.38 
How did a copy of the book come to be purchased by a Detroit police 
officer? In a 1955 essay published in The Antioch Review, James Rorty 
explains that the National Organization for Decent Literature (“NODL”), 
formed in 1937 under the leadership of a group of Catholic bishops, was 
actively campaigning against literature of the day that it deemed 
objectionable.39 In Detroit, the NODL had helped to organize the Citizens 
Committee for Better Youth Literature, which had a stated goal of working 
“actively for elimination from publication and circulation of such literature 
as may be detrimental to, or have no beneficial value in, the intellectual, 
social, cultural, or spiritual development of children and youth.”40 More 
importantly, Rorty writes that the NODL also found in Detroit its most 
important ally in a police inspector named Herbert W. Case, who headed 
Detroit’s License and Censor Bureau,41 and who Case characterized as 
“America’s number 1 book censor.”42 
Remarkably, Case’s bureau had a staff of twelve employees who read 
about 125 books each month, screening for those tomes that it thought were 
                                                                                                                 
 34. DAWN B. SOVA, BANNED BOOKS: LITERATURE SUPPRESSED ON SEXUAL GROUNDS 36 
(rev. ed. 2006). 
 35. Id.  
 36. High Court Upsets Ban on ‘Rugged’ Writing, WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 1957, at A1; 
High Court Voids Obscene-Book Act, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1957, at 1 (Butler “was arrested 
after he had sold the book to a Detroit police officer. He was found guilty of violating the 
Michigan statute and fined $100.”). 
 37. ROBERT W. HANEY, COMSTOCKERY IN AMERICA: PATTERNS OF CENSORSHIP AND 
CONTROL 33 (1960). 
 38. See A Brief History of Simon & Shuster, SIMON & SCHUSTER, 
http://www.simonandschuster.biz/corporate/history (last visited Feb. 20, 2012). 
 39. James Rorty, The Harassed Pocket-Book Publishers, 15 ANTIOCH REV. 411, 412–13 
(1955). 
 40. Id. at 414. 
 41. Id. at 417–18. 
 42. Id. at 419. 
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obscene.43 Such proactive governmental efforts at screening content in 
Detroit are astonishing when one compares them with the FCC today, 
which does not employ a single staff member to screen television shows 
and radio content for indecency.44 As Rorty explains the situation in 
Detroit: 
An assistant prosecuting attorney, a postal inspector, and an FBI agent 
are permanently attached to the bureau. If the official censors believe 
that a given pocket book violates the law, the passages considered 
objectionable—not the book as a whole—are submitted to the district 
attorney. If the latter confirms the censor’s verdict, the distributor is 
notified to that effect and he in turn notifies the publisher. The result, 
in most cases, is that the book is withdrawn from circulation without a 
court test.45 
Alfred E. Butler was charged after selling a paperbound reprint of The 
Devil Rides Outside.46 In an interesting twist, however, the sale to the 
Detroit police officer actually was pre-arranged to set up a test case. As a 
Time magazine article from the era notes: 
Alfred E. Butler, Detroit distributor for Pocket Books, Inc., deliberately 
got himself arrested and fined $100 for selling a police inspector a 50¢ 
paperback copy of John Howard Griffin’s The Devil Rides Outside, an 
earnest, if second-rate, novel about the sexual torments of a young man 
trying to attain monkish chastity. The fine was rescinded, however, and 
both Butler and the cops pushed the test case toward the Supreme 
Court for an answer.47 
Test cases involving deliberate arrests related to selling sexually explicit 
material, of course, are not rare.48 In this one, the Michigan statute under 
                                                                                                                 
 43. See id. at 418. 
 44. See Complaint Process, FCC, http://transition.fcc.gov/eb/oip/process.html (last 
visited Feb. 20, 2012). The FCC only responds to complaints that it receives. In particular, 
the FCC’s website provides: 
FCC staff reviews each complaint to determine whether it alleges information 
sufficient to suggest that a violation of the obscenity, profanity or indecency 
prohibition has occurred. If it appears that a violation may have occurred, the 
staff will commence an investigation, which may include sending a Letter Of 
Inquiry (“LOI”) to the broadcast station.  
Id. 
 45. Rorty, supra note 39, at 418. 
 46. Fanny Butcher, The Literary Spotlight, CHI. DAILY TRIB., May 5, 1957, at G11. 
 47. The Supreme Court: To Roast the Pig, TIME, Mar. 11, 1957, 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,824704,00.html.  
 48. For instance, during an all-out offensive by Fulton County Solicitor General Hinson 
McAuliffe during the mid-1970s against adult content in Atlanta, Georgia, Hustler 
magazine publisher Larry Flynt hurried there “from Cincinnati, where he had been 
convicted on pornography charges. Renting a newsstand for a day, he sold his publication 
and dared the solicitor to arrest him. Mr. McAullifee [sic] obliged.” B. Drummond Ayres, 
Jr., Anti-Obscenity Drive Disputed in Atlanta, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1977, at 22.   
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which Butler was prosecuted made it a crime to sell or give away to 
anyone, be it a child or an adult, a newspaper, book, magazine, or other 
printed content “tending to incite minors to violent or depraved or immoral 
acts” or “manifestly tending to the corruption of the morals of youth . . . 
.”49 A trial judge denied Butler’s motion to dismiss the case and found him 
guilty because the language was offensive and, demonstrating his own 
supposed literary understanding about plot development, because the 
offending language “was not necessary to the proper development of the 
theme of the book nor of the conflict expressed therein.”50 The Supreme 
Court of Michigan denied an appeal, and the U.S. Supreme Court chose to 
hear the case in February 1956.51 
In defending its statute before the high court, Michigan’s Solicitor 
General argued that by “quarantining the general reading public against 
books not too rugged for grown men and women in order to shield juvenile 
innocence, it is exercising its power to promote the general welfare.”52 In 
other words, keeping such content out of the hands of consenting adults in 
order to protect children was simply a necessary cost paid in promoting the 
greater good of the general public welfare. Put differently, a little collateral 
damage to the reading habits of willing adults is merely a small price borne 
for safeguarding minors. 
Justice Felix Frankfurter, joined by all of his fellow Justices, quickly 
dismissed this line of statutory defense. Frankfurter found the sweep of 
Michigan’s statute far too vast and overinclusive, writing that it was “not 
reasonably restricted to the evil with which it is said to deal. The incidence 
of this enactment is to reduce the adult population of Michigan to reading 
only what is fit for children.”53 He summed it up in what Professor Amitai 
Etzioni aptly called an “inimitable phrase”54 that would have lasting 
influence in many key free speech victories in subsequent decades: “Surely, 
this is to burn the house to roast the pig.”55 
The Court’s reasoning in Butler was simply that succinct; there was 
no extended analysis, as the entirety of the opinion was fewer than ten 
paragraphs in length. The decision was a victory for consenting adults to 
access and receive materials that, in the determination of legislative bodies, 
                                                                                                                 
 49. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 381 (1957) (quoting MICH. PENAL CODE § 
750.343 (1954)). 
 50. Id. at 382. 
 51. Butler v. Michigan, 350 U.S. 963, 963 (1956) (noting “probable jurisdiction”). 
 52. Butler, 352 U.S. at 383. 
 53. Id.  
 54. Amitai Etzioni, Symposium, Do Children Have the Same First Amendment Rights 
as Adults?: On Protecting Children From Speech, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 30 (2004). 
 55. Butler, 352 U.S. at 383. 
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are not suitable for minors. Sacrificing adults’ First Amendment rights in 
the process of protecting minors, in other words, simply was far too great 
of a Constitutional price to be paid. Michigan’s law, as one legal 
commentator contemptuously observed, “would have rendered the adult 
population to reading The Cat in the Hat.”56 To prevent this result, 
legislative bodies would need to draft more narrowly tailored laws in the 
future to protect adults’ rights to receive speech while simultaneously 
shielding minors from alleged ills of speech. The statutory bludgeoning of 
the First Amendment rights of adults to access otherwise protected speech 
was no longer tolerable. 
From where did the Butler principle first arise? Perhaps its origins 
exist in Judge Learned Hand’s57 opinion nearly one hundred years ago in 
the obscenity case of United States v. Kennerley.58 Hand wrote in 
Kennerley: 
I question whether in the end men will regard that as obscene which is 
honestly relevant to the adequate expression of innocent ideas, and 
whether they will not believe that truth and beauty are too precious to 
society at large to be mutilated in the interests of those most likely to 
pervert them to base uses. Indeed, it seems hardly likely that we are 
even to-day so lukewarm in our interest in letters or serious discussion 
as to be content to reduce our treatment of sex to the standard of a 
child’s library in the supposed interest of a salacious few, or that 
shame will for long prevent us from adequate portrayal of some of the 
most serious and beautiful sides of human nature. That such latitude 
gives opportunity for its abuse is true enough; there will be, as there 
are, plenty who will misuse the privilege as a cover for lewdness and a 
stalking horse from which to strike at purity, but that is true to-day and 
only involves us in the same question of fact which we hope that we 
have the power to answer.59 
Professor Lawrence Lessig observes that Butler is about 
proportionality and the narrow tailoring of statutes as a First Amendment 
requirement, such that “to banish the adult to protect the child would be to 
‘burn the house to roast the pig.’ Something more carefully focused is 
required.”60 Indeed, the Butler principle goes hand-in-hand with the 
overbreadth doctrine,61 with Justice John Paul Stevens writing, in the 
                                                                                                                 
 56. Christopher S. Maravilla, The Enforcement of First Amendment Obscenity 
Jurisprudence and New Technologies, 4 FLA. COASTAL L.J. 67, 75 (2002). 
 57. See generally GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE (1994) 
(providing an excellent biography of Learned Hand). 
 58. United States v. Kennerley, 209 F. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1913). 
 59. Id. at 120–21 (emphasis added). 
 60. Lawrence Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 869, 
884–85 (1996). 
 61. See Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 n.6 
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context of considering the constitutionality of the Child Online Protection 
Act, that “[i]n evaluating the overbreadth of such a statute, we should be 
mindful of Justice Frankfurter’s admonition not to ‘burn the house to roast 
the pig.’”62 Under the overbreadth doctrine, “a statute is facially invalid if 
it prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech.”63  
When the U.S. Supreme Court issued its ruling in Butler, Manuel Lee 
Robbins, the attorney from New York representing Butler, called it “a 
landmark in preserving the freedom of the press.”64 Robbins, who died at 
sixty-five years of age in 1975,65 certainly had the legal chops to win such 
a case, having graduated from Harvard College in 1932 and Harvard Law 
School in 1935.66 Before taking on Butler, Robbins had served as an 
assistant district attorney in New York City67—he worked under Thomas 
E. Dewey, who later became Governor of New York and twice ran 
unsuccessfully as a Republican for President of the United States68—and 
then worked in private practice at Stern & Reubens.69 Perhaps even more 
importantly, he had previously argued two other cases in front of the 
nation’s high court, thus giving him added experience and preparation for 
Butler.70   
                                                                                                                 
(2008) (“A law may be overturned as impermissibly overbroad because a ‘substantial 
number’ of its applications are unconstitutional, ‘judged in relation to the statute’s plainly 
legitimate sweep.’”) (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769–71 (1982)); see also 
United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 293 (2008) (“The first step in overbreadth analysis 
is to construe the challenged statute; it is impossible to determine whether a statute reaches 
too far without first knowing what the statute covers”). See generally John F. Decker, 
Overbreadth Outside the First Amendment, 34 N.M. L. REV. 53 (2004) (providing an 
excellent overview of the overbreadth doctrine, including its use in both First Amendment 
situations and other contexts); Richard H. Fallon Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 
YALE L.J. 853 (1991) (providing a critical examination of the overbreadth doctrine and 
suggesting ways to improve it).      
 62. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 604–05 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Butler 
v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957)).  
 63. Williams, 553 U.S. at 292. 
 64. Book Ruling Hailed: Lawyer Calls Supreme Court Ruling a ‘Landmark,’ N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 27, 1957, at 29. 
 65. Manuel Robbins, 65, Lawyer, Dewey Aide, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1975, at 28. 
 66. Dewey Names Three as Staff Assistants, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1936, at 2. 
 67. Eleanore Landau to Wed: Graduate of Dalton School Will Become Bride of Lee 
Robbins, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1941, at 24. 
 68. See generally Republicans Didn’t Vote, Dewey Says, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 1948, at 
M2 (describing Dewey as “the twice-defeated White House aspirant” and noting that he lost 
his second bid for president “by about two million votes.”). 
 69. Hogan’s Aide Resigns, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1947, at 15. 
 70. See Polizzi v. Cowles Magazines, Inc., 345 U.S. 663, 664 (1953) (identifying 
Robbins as counsel for respondent); United States v. Int’l Boxing Club of N.Y.C., 348 U.S. 
236, 237 (1955) (identifying Robbins as Special Assistant Attorney General of New York 
and arguing on behalf of the New York State Athletic Commission).  
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A Washington Post editorial at the time of the Butler ruling chimed in 
that “[i]t should not have required a Supreme Court decision to inform the 
Michigan Legislature and the City of Detroit that they cannot deprive the 
general public of raw literary fare because it may tend to corrupt the morals 
of children.”71 The Post’s editorial wryly noted that what the Detroit judge 
who initially convicted Alfred E. Butler had failed to do was to take into 
account that the police officer who purchased offending copy of The Devil 
Rides Outside “was not a child.”72 
Finally, it must be noted that the aphorism “burning down the house 
to roast the pig” actually was, as Professor Robert L. Tsai pointed out in an 
article about metaphors and constitutional law, a “favorite saying of Justice 
Frankfurter’s.”73 Professor Tsai explained: 
In its first incarnation in Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co.,74 the adage 
appeared as “burning down the barn to roast a pig.”75 A year later, 
Frankfurter shrewdly modernized the saying by replacing the barn with 
the more evocative and commonplace house.76 Given the post-war 
boom, the rise of home ownership, and the decline of the agrarian 
economy, a burning house certainly offered a more potent mental 
image than its predecessor.77 
After Butler, Professor Tsai observed, “jurists dispatched the legal chestnut 
with greater regularity.”78 For instance, Butler had an immediate impact in 
the Washington state case of Adams v. Hinkle79 involving a law that, in the 
name of preventing juvenile delinquency,80 forbade the sale of comic books 
to both minors and adults.81 In striking down the law in 1958, the Supreme 
                                                                                                                 
 71. Michigan Quarantine, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 1957, at A12. 
 72. Id.  
 73. Robert L. Tsai, Fire, Metaphor, and Constitutional Myth-Making, 93 GEO. L.J. 181, 
218 (2004). 
 74. 328 U.S. 217 (1946). 
 75. Id. at 234 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“[T]o reverse a judgment free from intrinsic 
infirmity and perhaps to put in question other judgments based on verdicts that resulted from 
the same method of selecting juries, reminds too much of burning the barn in order to roast 
the pig.”) (emphasis added). 
 76. Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 403 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) 
(“No doubt, when a court condemns practices as violative of the Sherman Law and the 
Clayton Act, it has the duty so to fashion its decree as to put an effective stop to that which 
is condemned. But the law also respects the wisdom of not burning even part of a house in 
order to roast a pig.”) (emphasis added). 
 77. Tsai, supra note 73, at 219–20 (citations omitted) (footnotes not in original).  
 78. Id. at 220. 
 79. 322 P.2d 844 (Wash. 1958). 
 80. The statute declared that “crime comic books are a factor in juvenile delinquency.” 
Id. at 847. 
 81. Id. at 852 (“While ostensibly aimed at sales to minors, it is not so limited. It applies 
to all sales and to all people.”). 
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Court of Washington analogized it to the law deemed unconstitutional in 
Butler, and it quoted Butler’s analogy of burning the house to roast the 
pig.82 
In 1959, Butler proved key in a federal judge’s decision in Paramount 
Film Distributing Corporation v. City of Chicago to enjoin a city ordinance 
that prohibited the showing of the movie Desire Under the Elms to anyone 
under twenty-one years of age because the movie “was unfit for 
children.”83 Specifically, the ordinance permitted “a limited license when a 
film approaches producing a harmful notion in the mind of anyone from 
one to twenty-one years of age.”84 In striking down the law, U.S. District 
Judge Sullivan used Butler to demonstrate its vast overbreadth in serving 
its ostensible goal: 
Assuming without deciding that the City might correct the evil of 
exhibiting films unfit for “children” the present section is unsuitable 
for the purpose. Under it, a twenty year old, married service man 
would be prevented from seeing a film that might not be suitable for a 
girl of twelve. As Justice Frankfurter remarked in a similar situation, 
“Surely, this is to burn the house to roast the pig”. As in the case just 
cited, the remedy is not appropriate for the end at which it is 
presumably aimed, and is an invalid exercise of police power.85 
With this background on Butler in mind, this Article now examines 
how the case repeatedly has influenced First Amendment jurisprudence 
during the fifty-five years following Justice Frankfurter’s parsimonious 
decision.  
III. THE LASTING LEGACY OF BUTLER ON FIRST AMENDMENT 
JURISPRUDENCE 
As emphasized at the end of the last part of this Article, Butler had an 
immediate impact in several cases at the state-law level.86 This Part 
illustrates how the Butler principle—that the First Amendment right of 
consenting adults to receive otherwise lawful speech87 cannot be sacrificed 
                                                                                                                 
 82. Id. at 854. 
 83. 172 F. Supp. 69, 70 (N.D. Ill. 1959). 
 84. Id. at 72. 
 85. Id. (quoting Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957)). 
 86. See supra notes 79–87 and accompanying text. 
 87. The phrase “otherwise lawful speech” refers to speech that does not fall into one of 
the narrow categories of content that the U.S. Supreme Court has held are not protected by 
the First Amendment. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 245–46 (2002) (“As 
a general principle, the First Amendment bars the government from dictating what we see or 
read or speak or hear. The freedom of speech has its limits; it does not embrace certain 
categories of speech, including defamation, incitement, obscenity, and pornography 
produced with real children.”). See also United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 
(2010) (identifying categories of historically and traditionally unprotected content to 
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by government adoption of blanket, all-inclusive bans on that speech in the 
name of protecting minors from it—has been applied repeatedly by the 
Supreme Court not only to a wide variety of factual scenarios, but also to a 
multitude of modes of speech delivery. 
A.  Ginsberg v. New York88 
In a recent article, Professor Stephen Bates asserted that “Butler led to 
what came to be known as the ‘variable obscenity’ doctrine—the notion 
that materials may be obscene as to minors but not as to adults.”89 Indeed, 
eleven years after Butler, the high court in Ginsberg “sanctioned the 
concept of variable obscenity, whereby the state can restrict a minor’s 
access to indecent speech or sexually explicit speech, which for adults is 
constitutionally protected.”90 It is not surprising, then, that a close Butler-
to-Ginsberg linkage exists for some scholars, such as Professor Donald 
Garner, who wrote: 
Taken together, Ginsberg and Butler stand for a relatively 
straightforward proposition: In order to protect children from the 
psychological and moral harm that may be inflicted on them by 
viewing explicitly sexual materials at a tender age, governments may 
adopt reasonable measures to make them inaccessible to children—so 
long as the measure does not prohibit or overly restrict adult access to 
the materials.91 
Ginsberg centered on a New York statute that prohibited the sale to 
minors—individuals under seventeen years of age—so-called “‘girlie’ 
picture magazines” that are not obscene for adults.92 In other words, 
children could not purchase such magazines, but adults could do so. As 
framed by the U.S. Supreme Court, the issue was whether it was 
constitutionally impermissible for New York “to accord minors under 17 a 
                                                                                                                 
include: a) obscenity; b) defamation; c) fraud; d) incitement; and e) speech integral to 
criminal conduct); IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 52 (1st Cir. 2008) (identifying 
“agreements in restraint of trade,” “statements or actions creating hostile work 
environments,” and “promises of benefits made by an employer during a union election” as 
“other species of speech-related regulations that effectively lie beyond the reach of the First 
Amendment,” despite the fact that “for whatever reason, the Justices have never deemed it 
necessary to address why or how these content-based prohibitions manage to escape First 
Amendment scrutiny.”). 
 88. 390 U.S. 629 (1968). 
 89. Stephen Bates, Symposium, Father Hill and Fanny Hill: An Activist Group’s 
Crusade to Remake Obscenity Law, 8 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 217, 265 (2010). 
 90. Debra D. Burke, Cybersmut and the First Amendment: A Call for a New Obscenity 
Standard, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 87, 118 (1996) (footnotes omitted). 
 91. Donald W. Garner, Fighting the Tobacco Wars on First Amendment Grounds, 27 
SW. U. L. REV. 379, 394–95 (1998). 
 92. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 634. 
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more restricted right than that assured to adults to judge and determine for 
themselves what sex material they may read or see.”93   
The Court upheld New York’s statute, reasoning that “[w]e do not 
regard New York’s regulation in defining obscenity on the basis of its 
appeal to minors under 17 as involving an invasion of such minors’ 
constitutionally protected freedoms.”94 Giving great deference to 
legislative judgment, Justice William Brennan wrote for a unanimous Court 
that it was “not irrational for the legislature to find that exposure to material 
condemned by the statute is harmful to minors.”95 
New York’s statutory scheme thus was upheld because it embraced 
the lesson learned in Butler. Rather than adopting a blanket, all-inclusive 
ban on otherwise lawful speech in the name of protecting minors, the New 
York legislature crafted a system that allowed adults to access nonobscene 
sexually explicit magazines but denied minors the opportunity to purchase 
it. While Butler rejected a one-size-fits-all statutory scheme, Ginsberg 
sanctioned what Professor Dawn Nunziato calls “a two-tiered, age-
dependent approach to regulating obscene content, in which states were 
granted greater latitude to regulate minors’ access than adults’ access to 
sexually-themed expression . . . .”96 Ginsberg thus flows naturally as a 
corollary from Butler, reaffirming its basic principle97 and extending its 
meaning to allow, as Professor Renee Newman Knake recently put it, “a 
state to define obscenity in a variable way, applying one definition to adults 
and another to children.”98 States today thus may adopt variable obscenity 
statutes99 provided that those statutes, as the Supreme Court of Wisconsin 
                                                                                                                 
 93. Id. at 637. 
 94. Id. at 638. 
 95. Id. at 641. 
 96. Dawn C. Nunziato, Toward a Constitutional Regulation of Minors’ Access to 
Harmful Internet Speech, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 121, 129 (2004). 
 97. See Eric J. Segall, In the Name of the Children: Government Regulation of 
Indecency on the Radio, Television, and the Internet-Let’s Stop the Madness, 47 U. 
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 697, 700 (2010) (writing that “[d]espite the Ginsberg Court’s differing 
treatment of obscenity for minors and adults, the Court reaffirmed its prior holding in Butler 
v. Michigan that the state cannot restrict what adults can read in the guise of protecting its 
youth.”) (footnote omitted). 
 98. Renee Newman Knake, From Research Conclusions to Real Change: 
Understanding the First Amendment's (Non)Response to the Negative Effects of Media on 
Children by Looking to the Example of Violent Video Game Regulations, 63 SMU L. Rev. 
1197, 1209 (2010). 
 99. See, e.g., State v. Weidner, 611 N.W.2d 684, 687 (Wisc. 2000) (referring to 
Wisconsin Statute Section 948.11, which restricts minors’ access to “harmful material” as “a 
variable obscenity statute” and adding that “[v]ariable obscenity statutes are premised on 
established constitutional tenets recognizing the significance of age in First Amendment 
jurisprudence.”). 
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observed in July 2011, “strike a proper balance between a state’s 
compelling interest in protecting children and an adult’s First Amendment 
right have access to materials not considered obscene for adults.”100 
B. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation101 
In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the 
FCC’s statutorily granted power102 to punish over-the-air broadcasters for 
carrying nonobscene,103 yet nonetheless indecent104 content.105 The 
decision was justified, in large part, by the goal of shielding minors from 
content that, as was the case in Butler, a government entity deemed 
objectionable.106 Despite this free speech defeat, the Butler principle 
stemmed the damage and prevented a complete rout by the FCC. 
In particular, the Court ended its opinion by writing “to emphasize the 
narrowness of our holding.”107 It stressed that the FCC’s decision to target 
indecent content “rested entirely on a nuisance rationale under which 
                                                                                                                 
 100. State v. Gonzalez, 802 N.W.2d 454, 478 (2011) (Prosser, J., concurring). 
 101. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
 102. See 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2010) (providing that “[w]hoever utters any obscene, 
indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication shall be fined under this 
title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both”). 
 103. Obscenity is not protected by the First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech. See 
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (writing that “obscenity is not within the 
area of constitutionally protected speech or press”). In Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 
(1973), the Supreme Court held that when determining if content is obscene, the fact finder 
must consider:  
(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards, 
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest . . .; 
(b) whether it depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct 
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether, taken as a 
whole, it lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.  
Id. at 24 (citations omitted). 
 104. The FCC provides, “[i]ndecent material contains sexual or excretory material that 
does not rise to the level of obscenity.” Obscenity, Indecency & Profanity—FAQ, FCC, 
http://www.fcc.gov/guides/obscenity-indecency-profanity-faq (last visited Feb. 20, 2012). 
The FCC considers material indecent: 
[I]f, in context, it depicts or describes sexual or excretory organs or activities in 
terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards 
for the broadcast medium. In each case, the FCC must determine whether the 
material describes or depicts sexual or excretory organs or activities and, if so, 
whether the material is patently offensive. 
Id. 
 105. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 750–51.  
 106. The Court wrote that “broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children, even those 
too young to read” and that the broadcast at issue in the case “could have enlarged a child’s 
vocabulary in an instant.” Id. at 749. 
 107. Id. at 750. 
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context is all-important. The concept requires consideration of a host of 
variables. The time of day was emphasized by the Commission.”108 The 
Court added that “the composition of the audience” was another variable in 
this nuisance calculus.109   
In other words, there are certain times of the day when children are 
less likely to be in the audience, and thus when indecent content must be 
allowed on the broadcast airwaves because adults have a First Amendment 
right to receive such content. To illustrate this point, the Court in Pacifica, 
much as it had done in Butler before, evoked a porcine metaphor of its own 
and wrote that a “‘nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong 
place,’—like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard.”110 Thus, the 
monologue of George Carlin at issue in Pacifica was like a pig that had 
intruded in the broadcast parlor—the parlor being those times of the day 
when children are likely to be in the audience—when it more properly 
belonged in the broadcast barnyard (the late night and early morning hours 
when children are less likely to be in the audience). Like the blanket ban in 
Butler on selling certain magazines and books in Michigan because they 
might harm minors was impermissible under the First Amendment, so too 
was a complete twenty-four hour ban on indecent broadcast content in 
order to protect minors.111 
The FCC acknowledges this fact today on its website, which states 
that “the courts have held that indecent material is protected by the First 
Amendment and cannot be banned entirely.”112 Thus, the First Amendment 
rights of adults to receive indecent speech cannot be completely quashed in 
the name of protecting children from that same expression. In fact, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in 1995 instructed the FCC 
“to limit its ban on the broadcasting of indecent programs to the period 
from 6:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m.”113 
The bottom line is that the Butler principle—that the First 
Amendment right of consenting adults to receive otherwise lawful 
                                                                                                                 
 108. Id.  
 109. Id.  
 110. Id. (quoting Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926)). 
 111. Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504, 1509 (D.C. Cir. 1991) 
(“The Commission must identify some reasonable period of time during which indecent 
material may be broadcast necessarily means that the Commission may not ban such 
broadcasts entirely. The fact that Congress itself mandated the total ban on broadcast 
indecency does not alter our view that, under ACT I, such a prohibition cannot withstand 
constitutional scrutiny.”). 
 112. Obscenity, Indecency & Profanity – FAQ, FCC, http://www.fcc.gov/guides/ 
obscenity-indecency-profanity-faq (last visited Feb. 20, 2012) (emphasis added). 
 113. Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 669–70 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
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speech114 cannot be sacrificed by government adoption of blanket, all-
inclusive bans on that speech in the name of protecting minors from it—
was stretched from the print medium in Butler to the broadcast medium in 
Pacifica. Although the Court certainly has adopted a medium-specific First 
Amendment jurisprudence that treats the print medium differently from the 
broadcast realm,115 the Butler principle cuts across different forms of 
media to apply equally to both. 
C.  Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.116 
In 1983, the Supreme Court in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp. 
held that a federal statute prohibiting the mailing of unsolicited 
advertisements for contraceptives violated the First Amendment speech 
rights of a company engaged in the manufacturing, sale, and distribution of 
contraceptives.117 After initially concluding that the informational flyers 
and mailings of Youngs Drug Products Corporation fit within the scope of 
the Court’s commercial speech118 jurisprudence,119 the Court examined the 
government’s asserted interests justifying the prohibition.120 
In particular, the government claimed that the law served two goals: 
“(1) shields mail recipients from materials that they are likely to find 
offensive; and (2) aids parents’ efforts to control the manner in which their 
children become informed about sensitive and important subjects such as 
birth control.”121 In addressing the latter of these two interests, the Court 
discussed the seeming ineffectiveness and futility of the law in facilitating 
the objective of helping parents control their children’s access to particular 
types of sensitive content. Justice Thurgood Marshall, in delivering the 
opinion of the Court, wrote: 
                                                                                                                 
 114. See supra note 87 (explaining the meaning of the phrase “otherwise lawful 
speech”). 
 115. There are distinct print and broadcast models of regulation under the Supreme 
Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & L.A. Powe, Jr., 
Converging First Amendment Principles for Converging Communications Media, 104 YALE 
L.J. 1719, 1721–24 (1995) (describing the print and broadcast models); Reno v. ACLU, 521 
U.S. 844, 868 (1997) (“Some of our cases have recognized special justifications for 
regulation of the broadcast media that are not applicable to other speakers.”). 
 116. 463 U.S. 60 (1983).  
 117. Id. at 61–64.  
 118. See generally R. Michael Hoefges, Regulating Professional Services Advertising: 
Current Constitutional Parameters and Issues Under the First Amendment Commercial 
Speech Doctrine, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 953 (2007) (providing an excellent 
overview of the commercial speech doctrine). 
 119. See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 68 (“[A]ll of the mailings in this case are entitled to the 
qualified but nonetheless substantial protection accorded to commercial speech.”). 
 120. Id. at 70–72.  
 121. Id. at 71. 
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[P]arents must already cope with the multitude of external stimuli that 
color their children’s perception of sensitive subjects. Under these 
circumstances, a ban on unsolicited advertisements serves only to assist 
those parents who desire to keep their children from confronting such 
mailings, who are otherwise unable to do so, and whose children have 
remained relatively free from such stimuli.122  
 Citing Butler, the Court reasoned that “[t]his marginal degree of 
protection is achieved by purging all mailboxes of unsolicited material that 
is entirely suitable for adults. We have previously made clear that a 
restriction of this scope is more extensive than the Constitution permits . . . 
.”123 Justice Marshall then provided his own colorful take on the Butler 
principle as it applied to the facts in Bolger: “The level of discourse 
reaching a mailbox simply cannot be limited to that which would be 
suitable for a sandbox.”124 
D.  Sable Communications of California v. FCC125 
In 1989, the U.S. Supreme Court held unconstitutional a federal 
statute that denied adults access to indecent telephone messages because 
the scope of the law “far exceeds that which is necessary to limit the access 
of minors to such messages.”126 In reaching this conclusion, the Court 
favorably cited Butler,127 reasoning that “this case, like Butler, presents us 
with ‘legislation not reasonably restricted to the evil with which it is said to 
deal.’”128 
The Supreme Court made it clear that the complete ban on indecent 
telephone messages was much more like Michigan’s unconstitutional 
statute in Butler than it was the FCC’s regulation of indecent speech in the 
broadcast medium that survived judicial review in Pacifica. The Court 
wrote that “Pacifica is readily distinguishable from [this case], most 
obviously because it did not involve a total ban on broadcasting indecent 
material,”129 adding that “issue of a total ban was not before the Court”130 
in Pacifica. 
Attorney Christopher S. Maravilla encapsulates the result in Sable 
well, writing that the Supreme Court in Sable struck down federal dial-a-
                                                                                                                 
 122. Id. at 73.  
 123. Id.  
 124. Id. at 74.  
 125. 492 U.S. 115 (1989). 
 126. Id. at 131. 
 127. Id. at 126–27.   
 128. Id. at 127 (quoting Butler, 352 U.S. at 383). 
 129. Id.  
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porn ban on indecent messages “for the same reasons” the Court in Butler 
struck down Michigan’s statute—namely, the “statute barred adult access 
to protected speech while preventing minors from accessing it.”131 At this 
point, it should be clear that the Butler principle has subsequently guided 
the Supreme Court’s opinions in the print medium (Ginsberg’s regulation 
of magazines), the broadcast medium (Pacifica’s regulation of indecency), 
and telephony (Sable’s regulation of dial-a-porn messages). This 
subsequent adoption demonstrates the benefits of the Court articulating 
clear-cut legal principles that can cut across all forms of media, as well as 
be applicable to different ranges of content, including second-class speech 
like commercial advertisements (Bolger).132  
E.  Reno v. ACLU133 
In its first foray into the depths of cyberspace to consider the scope of 
First Amendment protection to extend to speech conveyed on the Internet, 
the U.S. Supreme Court in 1997 declared unconstitutional two federal 
statutory provisions of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 
(“CDA”).134 Those provisions were known, respectively, as the indecent 
transmission provision and the patently offensive display provision.135 The 
former provision prohibited “the knowing transmission of obscene or 
indecent messages to any recipient under 18 years of age,”136 while the 
latter “prohibits the knowing sending or displaying of patently offensive 
messages in a manner that is available to a person under 18 years of 
age.”137   
In striking down these parts of the law targeting nonobscene yet 
sexually explicit content, Justice John Paul Stevens cited Butler.138 He 
                                                                                                                 
 131. Maravilla, supra note 56, at 75. 
 132. The U.S. Supreme Court concedes that it affords “commercial speech a limited 
measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First 
Amendment values, while allowing modes of regulation that might be impermissible in the 
realm of noncommercial expression.” Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 
(1978). A federal appellate court recently observed that “other forms of expression are 
entitled to more protection under the First Amendment than is commercial speech.” Pagan 
v. Fruchey, 492 F.3d 766, 770 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 133. 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
 134. See id. at 885. In striking down the two provisions, Justice Stevens wrote that the 
Court presumed “that governmental regulation of the content of speech is more likely to 
interfere with the free exchange of ideas than to encourage it. The interest in encouraging 
freedom of expression in a democratic society outweighs any theoretical but unproven 
benefit of censorship.” Id. 
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 136. Id. at 859. 
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reasoned that although “[i]t is true that we have repeatedly recognized the 
governmental interest in protecting children from harmful materials,” such 
an “interest does not justify an unnecessarily broad suppression of speech 
addressed to adults.”139 Justice Stevens went further to quote Justice 
Marshall’s sandbox spin on the Butler principle in Bolger140—that “‘the 
level of discourse reaching a mailbox simply cannot be limited to that 
which would be suitable for a sandbox.’”141 Stevens also analogized the 
sections of the CDA at issue in Reno to the statute declared 
unconstitutional under the Butler principle in the dial-a-porn case of 
Sable142 addressed earlier in this Article.143 
The problem, under the Butler principle, for the CDA provisions was 
that they would unnecessarily punish adult-to-adult communications in the 
name of protecting children. As Justice Stevens wrote: 
In arguing that the CDA does not so diminish adult communication, 
the Government relies on the incorrect factual premise that prohibiting 
a transmission whenever it is known that one of its recipients is a 
minor would not interfere with adult-to-adult communication. The 
findings of the District Court make clear that this premise is untenable. 
Given the size of the potential audience for most messages, in the 
absence of a viable age verification process, the sender must be 
charged with knowing that one or more minors will likely view it. 
Knowledge that, for instance, one or more members of a 100-person 
chat group will be a minor—and therefore that it would be a crime to 
send the group an indecent message—would surely burden 
communication among adults.144 
Writing an opinion in Reno that both concurred and dissented in part 
from the Opinion of the Court, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor considered 
portions of the CDA to be a fatally flawed “attempt by Congress to create 
‘adult zones’ on the Internet” because “they stray from the blueprint our 
prior cases have developed for constructing a ‘zoning law’ that passes 
constitutional muster.”145 In order for such a zoning law that attempts to 
strike a balance between the First Amendment rights of adults and minors 
to be valid, Justice O’Connor explained, two criteria must be satisfied: 1) 
the law must “not unduly restrict adult access to the material”; and 2) 
minors must have no First Amendment right to access the banned 
                                                                                                                 
 139. Id. at 875. 
 140. See supra Part III.C (discussing Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 
(1983). 
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material.146 She elaborated on this zoning-based balancing of adult rights 
with protection of minors, writing: 
Our cases make clear that a “zoning” law is valid only if adults are still 
able to obtain the regulated speech. If they cannot, the law does more 
than simply keep children away from speech they have no right to 
obtain—it interferes with the rights of adults to obtain constitutionally 
protected speech and effectively “reduce[s] the adult population . . . to 
reading only what is fit for children.”147 
In brief, Butler proved its importance in Reno to a new medium of speech 
that today increasingly dominates communication. 
F.  United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.148 
In 2000, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of federal 
statutes requiring cable system operators to either impose scrambling and 
blocking measures on channels that were primarily devoted to sexually 
explicit programming or, in the absence of such technological measures, to 
limit the transmission of those channels to an eight-hour window from 
10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.149 In fact, this largely proved to be a false choice, 
as Justice Anthony Kennedy explained in writing the Opinion of the Court: 
The effect of the federal statute on the protected speech is now 
apparent. It is evident that the only reasonable way for a substantial 
number of cable operators to comply with the letter of § 505 is to time 
channel, which silences the protected speech for two-thirds of the day 
in every home in a cable service area, regardless of the presence or 
likely presence of children or of the wishes of the viewers.150 
Although the federal statutes did not create a complete ban, Justice 
Kennedy reasoned that this made no difference, observing that “[t]o 
prohibit this much speech is a significant restriction of communication 
between speakers and willing adult listeners, communication which enjoys 
First Amendment protection. It is of no moment that the statute does not 
impose a complete prohibition.”151 Justice Kennedy deployed the Butler 
principle in declaring the law unconstitutional, writing that “[t]his case 
involves speech alone; and even where speech is indecent and enters the 
home, the objective of shielding children does not suffice to support a 
blanket ban if the protection can be accomplished by a less restrictive 
alternative.”152 
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G.  Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition153 
Forty-five years after Butler, the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Free 
Speech Coalition struck down portions of a federal statute that extended the 
Court’s lack of First Amendment protection for child pornography 
involving real minors154 to also sweep up virtual child pornography, 
namely “sexually explicit images that appear to depict minors but were 
produced without using any real children.”155 In defending the statute, the 
government argued, in part, that the law was necessary “because 
pedophiles may use virtual child pornography to seduce children.”156 In 
other words, images of virtual child pornography, when viewed by a minor 
who is shown them by a pedophile, might lead the minor to be sexually 
exploited at the hands of the pedophile. 
Writing the Opinion of the Court, Justice Anthony Kennedy rejected 
this argument, citing Butler as a key precedent in doing so.157 Kennedy 
wrote, “[t]he precedents establish, however, that speech within the rights of 
adults to hear may not be silenced completely in an attempt to shield 
children from it.”158 He explained why the statute in Free Speech Coalition 
was controlled by the Butler principle: 
Here, the Government wants to keep speech from children not to 
protect them from its content but to protect them from those who 
would commit other crimes. The principle, however, remains the same: 
The Government cannot ban speech fit for adults simply because it may 
fall into the hands of children.159 
In light of the statute’s broad reach, the Court ultimately concluded that the 
two sections of the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 at issue in 
Free Speech Coalition were fatally overbroad.160 From state bans on books 
like The Devil Rides Outside to federal proscriptions on fake child 
pornography, the maxim in Butler has repeatedly proven powerful before 
the nation’s high court. 
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270 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Butler’s logic from the 1950s remains vibrant today in the digital 
media era. For instance, in June 2011—more than a half-century after 
Butler—a federal judge in American Booksellers Foundation for Free 
Expression v. Sullivan struck down an Alaska statute targeting the 
electronic distribution of indecent materials to minors.161 The law was 
challenged, as U.S. District Judge Ralph R. Beistline observed, by “a 
spectrum of individuals and organizations -- including booksellers, a 
photographer, libraries, and organizations representing booksellers, 
publishers and other media interests -- that communicate, disseminate, 
display and access a broad range of speech in the physical world as well as 
through the Internet.”162 Although the statute was designed to protect 
minors, Judge Beistline pointed out “that adults communicating with other 
adults on the Internet may run afoul of the Alaska statute, as written, if the 
communication falls into the hands of a minor.”163  
Employing the Butler principle, Judge Beistline reasoned that, given 
the terms of the Alaska law, adults “who fear the possibility of a minor 
receiving speech intended for an adult may refrain from exercising their 
right to free speech at all -- an unacceptable result. The Government may 
not reduce the adult population to only what is fit for children.”164 As such, 
Judge Beistline concluded that the statute, although well intended, simply 
was “not narrowly tailored to achieve the State’s compelling interest.”165   
The lasting importance of Butler thus is as straightforward as the five-
page opinion itself: free speech rights of adults cannot be sacrificed at the 
altar of child protection. Instead, balances must be struck, compromises 
must be reached, and statutes should be narrowly drawn and carefully 
crafted to achieve such middle-ground outcomes that appeal to the First 
Amendment rights of adults and to those who believe minors need some 
level of protection.166 All or nothing outcomes—blanket, overbroad bans 
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on content—will not cut it, as the doctrine of variable obscenity spawned 
by the holding in Butler and embraced by the Court in Ginsberg 
illustrate.167 Likewise, Butler’s famous analogy of burning the house to 
roast the pig continues to resonate with courts today to exemplify the 
principle of overbreadth.168    
Part of the power of the Butler principle lies in the fact that it is not 
tethered to any specific mode or medium of communication. It applies as 
easily to print as it does to the Internet. This is particularly significant in a 
time of media convergence, and courts would be wise to fashion similar 
non-medium-specific First Amendment standards. 
The simplicity of the Butler principle also is important because it 
allows the principle to be tweaked and used by courts to stand for broader 
propositions. For instance, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia in 1984 cited Butler to support the position that “[s]peakers are 
not required to indulge the lowest common denominator of the populace; 
[F]irst [A]mendment protection is not limited only to messages which 
every reader, no matter how ill-informed or inattentive, can 
comprehend.”169 
Although at least one scholar may publicly doubt whether the framers 
of the First Amendment would have intended the Butler principle,170 this 
Article has attempted to make it clear that, time and time again, the U.S. 
Supreme Court, as well as other courts, have embraced it in many different 
contexts.171 For instance, in 2008, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit in Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle considered the 
constitutionality of a Texas statute that made it a crime to promote or sell 
sex toys to adults.172 That seems, of course, to be quite a long way from the 
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type of law at issue in Butler. But Texas argued that the statute was 
necessary to protect minors “from exposure to sexual devices and their 
advertisement.”173 Citing the Butler principle that the adult population 
cannot be reduced to only materials that are fit for children,174 the Fifth 
Circuit reasoned in striking down the law that, while “[i]t is undeniable that 
the government has a compelling interest in protecting children from 
improper sexual expression,”175 Texas’s “generalized concern for children 
does not justify such a heavy-handed restriction on the exercise of a 
constitutionally protected individual right.”176 
When it is not being applied to bans on the sale and promotion of sex 
toys, the Butler principle is deployed by jurists with equal aplomb to 
proscriptions on beer bottles with offensive labels. The U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit began its lead paragraph of the 1998 case of 
Bad Frog Brewery, Inc. v. New York State Liquor Authority177 with this 
humorous framing of the constitutional conflict: 
A picture of a frog with the second of its four unwebbed “fingers” 
extended in a manner evocative of a well known human gesture of 
insult178 has presented this Court with significant issues concerning 
First Amendment protections for commercial speech. The frog appears 
on labels that Bad Frog Brewery, Inc. (“Bad Frog”) sought permission 
to use on bottles of its beer products. The New York State Liquor 
Authority (“NYSLA” or “the Authority”) denied Bad Frog’s 
application.179 
The NYSLA prohibited Bad Frog’s use of the labels under all 
circumstances, asserting that the ban was justified in insulating children 
from vulgarity and promoting temperance.180 In finding that this blanket 
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prohibition was not narrowly tailored to serve those interests, the Second 
Circuit cited Butler.181 It reasoned that “NYSLA’s complete statewide ban 
on the use of Bad Frog’s labels lacks a ‘reasonable fit’ with the state’s 
asserted interest in shielding minors from vulgarity, and NYSLA gave 
inadequate consideration to alternatives to this blanket suppression of 
commercial speech.”182 In brief, from modern day bans on sex toys to all-
out prohibitions on risqué beer labels, Butler is a proven, powerful antidote 
to censorial proclivities of legislative and administrative bodies across the 
United States. 
In an excellent essay bridging the realms of literature and law 
published more than four decades ago in the Journal of Aesthetic 
Education, E. F. Kaelin asserted that one key result of the high court’s 
ruling in Butler was to highlight: 
[T]he social effects of appeals to law as the primary means of social 
control: any law is universal in its application and thus may be too 
permissive or too restrictive to deal effectively with the social good it 
is intended to promote or the social evil it is to prevent; and unless 
society wishes to condone the violation of individual rights guaranteed 
by our Constitution, it must create other institutional procedures for 
protecting the morals of the young and incompetent.183 
Today, those other institutional procedures and means for protecting 
the young are largely driven by technological developments that never 
could have been envisioned in 1957 when Butler was decided. For instance, 
when it comes to television content, any parent who is concerned about his 
or her child’s viewing habits can use the V-chip.184 In particular, according 
to the FCC’s own website, all television sets thirteen inches or larger sold 
in the United States since January 1, 2000, must have a V-chip.185 That 
means, of course, that more than one full decade has passed for any 
interested parent to purchase such a TV set and to make good use of the V-
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chip if he or she sees fit. In brief, technology—not governmental 
censorship—facilitates parental authority over minors’ viewing habits.  
In conclusion, it was Anthony Comstock—the Secretary of the New 
York Society for the Suppression of Vice, which “censored literature in 
America for more than sixty years”186—who is first credited for turning the 
phrase “devil-traps” for the young.187 As the late Professor Margaret 
Blanchard noted, Comstock was referring to dime novels “that featured 
brash Western heroes and hard-boiled big city detectives.”188 He believed, 
as Blanchard put it, that these writings “were leading youths down the path 
to destruction, for once a child had read such stories, no one could prevent 
a career of crime and the loss of an immortal soul.”189 
There will always be people who believe that certain types of media 
content—from messages posted on social media to violent video games to 
types of content we cannot even envision today—are devil-traps for 
minors. Indeed, Yale Law School Professor Jack Balkin has observed that 
society often: 
[T]urn[s] to children as the master trope, the perspective through which 
we can talk about cultural control, while at the same time professing 
our respect for freedom of speech. Because children have fewer first 
amendment rights than adults, because children need to be protected, 
shaped, educated, and so on, and because children are the future of our 
culture, we can reconcile our conflicting desires by viewing all cultural 
issues in terms of children and their interests and needs.190 
But just as surely as such thinking will always cause those like 
Anthony Comstock to see devil-traps lurking wherever they look and in 
whatever form of media, the Butler principle, as this Article has 
demonstrated, will stand firmly against the type of censorship traps that 
ensnare adults at the same time that they shield minors. 
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